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NEUROSCIENCE AND CRIMINAL LAW: HAVE
WE BEEN GETTING IT WRONG FOR CENTURIES
AND WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
Elizabeth Bennett*
INTRODUCTION
Moral responsibility is the foundation of criminal law. Will the rapid
developments in neuroscience and brain imaging crack that foundation—or,
perhaps, shatter it completely? Although many scholars have opined on the
subject, as far as I have discovered, few come from a front-line perspective.
The concept of English (now Anglo-American) criminal law has evolved
slowly but surely over the past one thousand years. It has responded, in
part, to knowledge of the human condition and, in part, to power struggles
between church and state.1 In the Anglo-Saxon period, society generally
considered bad conduct as a tort—including conduct that society now
considers as criminal, such as homicide.2 The remedy often was
compensatory, although blood feuds between families or tribes also
resulted.3 While the Roman tradition of the Law of the Twelve Tables
certainly speaks to intent as opposed to negligence, it generally treats bad
conduct as torts.4 As society matured, criminal conduct became more of a
concern to society as a whole, as opposed to only private individuals. The
King’s Courts developed, and by the twelfth century, in the time of Henry
II, crimes of homicide, mayhem, robbery, arson, and rape were under their
jurisdiction.5 The compensatory remedy for these crimes ended, and
punishment emerged as a new remedy for criminal conduct.6
By the thirteenth century, society was considering the concept of “actus
non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” (meaning “an act does not make one
* Justice Bennett began her career as a court worker with the Elizabeth Fry Society
(dedicated to improving the conditions of women in the criminal justice system), has been a
prosecutor, a defense attorney, a superior court trial judge, and is currently an appellate court
judge in Canada. This Article is part of a symposium entitled Criminal Behavior and the
Brain: When Law and Neuroscience Collide held at Fordham University School of Law.
For an overview of the symposium, see Deborah W. Denno, Foreword: Criminal Behavior
and the Brain: When Law and Neuroscience Collide, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2016).
1. See 2 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 5–7 (4th ed., 2d
impression 1976); A.K.R. KIRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 25 (7th ed. 1984).
2. See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 43.
3. See id. at 36, 43–45.
4. See The Twelve Tables, in ANCIENT ROMAN STATUTES 9, 11 (Clyde Pharr ed., 2003).
5. See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 48, 197.
6. See id. at 48, 198, 358.
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guilty, without a guilty mind”) as a part of the criminal law in England.7
Henry de Bracton, a cleric and a jurist, authored a criminal law treatise, On
the Laws and Customs of England, in which he discussed the concept of
mens rea (a guilty mind) as evil motive, drawing from canon law.8
Over time, the notion of evil motive evolved into intent for a crime,
regardless of motive and of the religious concept of evil. Lack of
responsibility was, and still is, recognized by exculpating the young, the
insane, and those who engaged in accidental conduct.9 Today, the law
looks to knowledge, foresight of consequences, recklessness, willful
blindness, and criminally negligent conduct.10 Defenses that excuse
conduct, such as insanity, intoxication, duress, automatism, and color of
right (i.e., an honest belief that conduct is legal) also respond to the
requirement of a guilty mind.11
One thing is clear: the development of the criminal law is not static. It
changes and fluctuates in accordance with the times, the sophistication of
society, and what is known about the human condition. Indeed, in the past,
animals were found culpable committing “crimes,” including homicide.12
The foregoing is a sampling of a broad sweep of changes that developed
over centuries, brushing quickly over times of torture to obtain confessions,
the Inquisitions, and the infamous “witch trials,”13 to name a few of the
time periods characterized by horror. Despite the terrible acts that occurred
during these periods, the punishment for criminal conduct was based on a
form of evil intent defined by the times.
In essence, for the past eight hundred years, criminal law has been based
on a model of a criminal act (the actus reus)14 and a criminal mind (the
mens rea).15 The concepts of proportionality and moral blameworthiness or
intent apply as well to the punishment that will be imposed, again
developing over centuries from lex talionis (the law of retaliation) or “an

7. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979);
see also 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 259.
8. See generally HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND
(George E. Woodbine ed., Samuel E. Thorne trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (n.d.).
9. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00 (McKinney 2016) (providing for an infancy defense);
MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01(1), 4.01 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (stating
that there is no criminal liability for the insane or for involuntary conduct); 2 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 1, at 53 (“It was recognized in the laws of Henry I that the lunatic and the infant
cannot be held liable.”).
10. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (defining modern levels of criminal culpability including
acting purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently).
11. See id. §§ 2.01(1), 2.04, 2.08, 2.09, 4.01 (providing for defenses of insanity,
intoxication, duress, automatism, and ignorance and mistake).
12. The earliest known record of an animal trial is the execution of a pig in 1266 at
Fontenay-aux-Roses, France. See JOYCE E. SALISBURY, THE BEAST WITHIN: ANIMALS IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 108 (2d ed. 2011).
13. See generally JAMES SPRENGER & HENRY KRAMER, MALLEUS MALEFICARUM
(Montague Summers trans., 1928) (1486), http://www.malleusmaleficarum.org/downloads/
MalleusAcrobat.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2AK-7TV2].
14. Actus reus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
15. See KIRALFY, supra note 1, at 22 (defining mens rea).
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eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth.”16 The concept is found in the ancient
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, which dates back to 1754 B.C.17
The retributivist theory of punishment is proportional punishment, or
“just deserts.”18 The punishment imposed under this theory is based on
what is deserved, measured by the moral responsibility of the offender for
his or her conduct. This concept applies at the guilt-finding phase and the
sentencing phase, both of which are discussed in more detail in this Article.
In the modern day, the concept of proportionality differs significantly
from person to person, place to place, and country to country. Perhaps
nothing signifies this difference more than the imposition of the death
penalty for homicide in certain parts of the world and for far lesser
“crimes,” including drug trafficking and adultery, in other parts of the
world.19 Indeed, several countries maintain the death penalty for same-sex
sexual acts,20 which many countries celebrate rather than criminalize.21
I. THE EFFECT OF NEUROSCIENCE
ON THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL INTENT
Although the two foundations of Anglo-American criminal law are
applied very differently depending on the society, culture, and local law, the
two fundamental premises are the same: (1) acts considered criminal need
to have some level of criminal intent22 and (2) punishment must be
proportional to the degree of criminal intent.23
16. Lex talionis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979); see also 2 HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 1, at 42.
17. See J. Dyneley Prince, The Code of Hammurabi, 8 AM. J. THEOLOGY 601, 607
(1904) (reviewing ROBERT FRANCIS HARPER, THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, KING OF BABYLON
ABOUT 2250 B.C. (1904)).
18. See Anthony Duff, Legal Punishment, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 13, 2013),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/3EYZ-MAFR].
19. See AMNESTY INT’L, DEATH PENALTY 2015: FACTS AND FIGURES (Apr. 6, 2016, 2:05
PM),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/04/Death-penalty-2015-Facts-andfigures/ [https://perma.cc/S97G-4BC8]; AMNESTY INT’L, 2015 WORLD DAY AGAINST THE
DEATH PENALTY: NOT THE SOLUTION TO DRUG-RELATED CRIME 13 (Oct. 2015), https://
www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ACT5026342015ENGLISH.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2SM9-V9BD]; LIV TØNNESSEN & SAMIA AL-NAGAR, CHR. MICHELSEN INST., WOMEN AND
GIRLS CAUGHT BETWEEN RAPE AND ADULTERY IN SUDAN: CRIMINAL LAW REFORM, 2005–
2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5661-women-and-girls-caughtbetween-rape-and-adultery.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNL8-CG7J].
20. See Max Bearak & Darla Cameron, Here Are the 10 Countries Where
Homosexuality May Be Punished by Death, WASH. POST (June 16, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/06/13/here-are-the-10-countrieswhere-homosexuality-may-be-punished-by-death-2/ [https://perma.cc/L23W-LQPT].
21. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (guaranteeing same-sex
couples the constitutional right to marry); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking
down a Texas sodomy law, thereby making consensual same-sex acts between adults legal in
every state in the United States).
22. I recognize that there are crimes that invoke criminal negligence, but even with those
crimes, there is some connection to knowledge or foreseeability of consequences that render
the conduct criminal as opposed to civil.
23. See 2 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 1, at 43–54; KIRALFY, supra note 1, at 22–23. The
turning point of criminal law reform in relation to punishment was the 1764 publication of
Cesare Beccaria’s On Crimes and Punishment. See CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
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Will rapid advances in neuroscience change these fundamental premises
of the criminal law? In other words, have we been getting it wrong for
centuries? In my opinion, the answer is no, we have not—or at least not
yet. However, the advent of neuroscience will hopefully make the
application of these premises more accurate and will achieve a fairer result
for many of those charged and convicted of criminal offenses.
In the seminal book Punishment and Responsibility, H.L.A. Hart
discussed the limits placed on punishment by the “excusing conditions,”
including mental disease, automatism, mistaken belief about the
circumstances surrounding the act, and subjection to gross forms of
coercion—all of which negate the “free will” aspect of conduct.24 He
opined:
If an individual breaks the law when none of the excusing conditions are
present he is ordinarily said to have acted of “his own free will,” “of his
own accord,” “voluntarily”; or it might be said, “He could have helped
doing what he did.” If the determinist has anything to say on this subject,
it must be because he makes two claims. The first claim is that it may be
true—though we cannot yet show and may never be able to show that it is
true—that human conduct (including in that expression not only actions
involving the movements of the human body but its psychological
elements or components such as decisions, choices, experiences of desire,
effort, etc.) are subject to certain types of law, where law is to be
understood in the sense of a scientific law. The second claim is that, if
human conduct so understood is in fact subject to such laws (though at the
present time we do not know it to be so), the distinction we draw between
one who acts under excusing conditions and one who acts when none are
present becomes unimportant, if not absurd.25

Thus, long before the recent developments of neuroscience, Hart—the
foremost scholar on legal philosophy and jurisprudence—talked about the
determinist approach, which he did not endorse.26 But more importantly for
our purposes, he recognized that, at that time, the determinists could not
conclusively show nor demonstrate that the movements of the human body
were subject to scientific laws, such as the laws of physics and cause and
effect.27 One wonders if his opinion would change with the progress of
neuroscience.

PUNISHMENT (David Young trans., 1986) (1764); see also HARRY ELMER BARNES, THE
STORY OF PUNISHMENT: A RECORD OF MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN 95–99 (2d ed. rev.
1972).
24. H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 28 (1968).
25. Id. at 28–29 (footnotes omitted).
26. See id.
27. See id.

2016]

NEUROSCIENCE AND CRIMINAL LAW

441

A. The Science
This section discusses the recent developments of neuroscience and then
examines if and how the developments in neuroscience will affect the
criminal law in profound and fundamental ways.28
Cognitive neuroscience is defined as “the field of scientific endeavor that
is trying to understand how the brain enables the mind.”29 With the
development and increased use of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI), brain function can be utilized to see images of what parts of the
brain are active when a person does certain activities or performs certain
tasks.30 A very simple description of how fMRI works is that it detects
changes associated with blood flow in the brain.31 The primary technique
used measures fluctuations in the amount of oxygen in the blood passing
through the brain as a result of neural activity. These changes can be seen
on the fMRI scan.32 The fMRI shows brain activity at the time of the scan
and is dependent on a number of factors.33 Adina L. Roskies addresses the
common misconception that functional brain imaging is mind reading.34 It
is not. It does not permit one to read a person’s thoughts. Of significance
is that identifying an abnormal brain does not mean that the abnormal brain
caused the conduct in question.35 Roskies points out that brains change
with age and experience; they do not remain static.36 Thus, if the scan of
the offender occurs months or years after an offense and an abnormality
appears, that does not demonstrate that the abnormality was there when the
offense occurred or whether it would have affected the behavior.
It is very clear that, at this time at least, brain imaging cannot tell us
much, if anything, about whether a person intended to commit a crime or
the degree of responsibility, if any, he or she had for committing the crime.
One might ask at this juncture, what is all the fuss about? The fuss arises
from the potential of the fMRI to predict or explain behavior.
B. The Scientific Challenge to Criminal Intent
In 2004, in an oft-cited and thought-provoking article, Joshua Greene and
Jonathan Cohen explained how science may challenge our understanding of

28. Of course, hundreds, if not thousands, of articles and books have been written on this
subject in the recent past. The opinions are divergent, and I was only able to scratch the
surface in terms of the thoughts, ideas, and opinions on the subject.
29. Michael S. Gazzaniga, What Is Cognitive Neuroscience?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO
NEUROSCIENCE: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 2, 2 (Andrew S. Mansfield ed., 2010).
30. Adina L. Roskies, Brain Imaging Techniques, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE 37, 37 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013).
31. See id. at 41.
32. Id. at 41–42.
33. Id. at 47–48.
34. Id. at 66.
35. Id. at 68.
36. Id. at 70.
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criminal intent.37 Greene and Cohen revert back to the centuries-old debate
of free will and determinism.38 The debate can be briefly summarized as
follows:
 Determinism: everything is determined by (i) the law of physics and
(ii) the past;
 Free will: the ability to do otherwise;
 Compatibilism: if determinism is true, it is compatible with free will;
 Incompatibilism: free will and determinism are incompatible, therefore
both cannot be true;
o Hard determinism: recognizes the incompatibility, denies free
will, and accepts determinism; and
o Libertarianism:
recognizes the incompatibility, denies
determinism, and accepts free will.39
Greene and Cohen seem to fall into the hard determinism school of
thought.40 They argue that neuroscience will demonstrate that the
retributivist theory of punishment, which is based on moral responsibility,
is misguided and simply wrong.41 They argue that the existing law is based
on an “intuitive sense” of justice.42 The law relies on what is sometimes
referred to as a “folk psychological” explanation of human behavior.43 The
law presumes that individuals are capable of reason, meaning that they are
capable of forming and acting on intentions that are a result of the person’s
desires and beliefs.44 Greene and Cohen argue that neuroscience will
undermine the understanding or intuitive belief that the general public holds
with respect to what causes people to commit criminal acts.45 Once this
understanding is gone, the public will recognize that the current foundation
of criminal law will crumble and change, and other philosophical bases will
supplant the retributivist view.46
The retributivist view is that people who engage in criminal behavior
deserve to be punished to the degree of their moral responsibility.47 The
retributivist law requires that people have a capacity for rational behavior in
order to attribute moral responsibility to them.48

37. See generally Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience
Changes Nothing and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1775
(2004).
38. Id. at 1775–76. As an aside, while the legal philosophers debate this issue, it is
seldom an actual concern of those who impose the punishment that is sanctioned by the law
on offenders.
39. Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Neuroscience, Normativity, and Retributivism,
in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT 133, 139 (Thomas A. Nadelhoffer ed., 2013).
40. Id. at 141.
41. Greene & Cohen, supra note 37, at 1776.
42. Id. at 1775.
43. Pardo & Patterson, supra note 39, at 135 n.7.
44. Id. at 135.
45. Greene & Cohen, supra note 37, at 1775–76.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 1776; Pardo & Patterson, supra note 39, at 134.
48. Greene & Cohen, supra note 37, at 1776.
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Benjamin Libet worked to debunk the retributivist view through his
experiments in the 1980s, which were said to demonstrate that there was no
free will.49 Subjects were wired to an electroencephalogram (EEG), which
detects electrical activity in the brain.50 Then, they were asked to choose to
lift a finger or move a wrist.51 The subjects were to report the exact second
that they felt the urge to move.52 Libet and his colleagues found that the
activity in the motor area of the brain could be detected some four hundred
milliseconds before the subjects were aware of their decision to move.53 In
a similar study in 2011, using an fMRI, Professor John-Dylan Haynes found
that the indication in the brain of whether a person would choose his right
or left hand to push a button came seven seconds before the subject was
aware of which hand he or she would use.54
These studies are said to undermine the essence of free will; clearly, the
brain decides what actions it will take before the mind is aware.55 Greene,
Cohen, and their proponents believe that once this is recognized, common
sense notions of free will, and thereby the retributivist theory, will be
abandoned, and the theory they espouse, the consequentialist approach, will
rise.56
The consequentialist approach is not based on past acts, like
retributivism, but on the future.57 The consequentialist approach is based
on deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of the public.58
Consequentialists argue that this will bring a more “humane” treatment of
offenders.59 Punishment is then based not on moral responsibility or
blameworthiness but on fixing or changing the behavior. As discussed in
more detail below, those who are tasked with the responsibility (moral or
otherwise) of sentencing people for their crimes apply both retributivist and
consequentialist theory (although few would recognize what they are doing
by these names). A fair sentencing regime cannot exist without both of
these sentencing principles; one cannot and should not exclude the other.
This view, that one should not look backward, focusing on responsibility
or on the previous criminal record or history of an accused, but rather
should focus on the rehabilitation of the offender, or the “cure” for
criminality, did not originate in the twenty-first century. In fact, this view
49. SALLY SATEL & SCOTT O. LILIENFELD, BRAINWASHED 133 (2013).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Benjamin Libet et al., Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of
Cerebral Activity (Readiness-Potential): The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary
Act, 106 BRAIN 623 (1983).
54. John-Dylan Haynes, Decoding and Predicting Intentions, 1224 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD.
SCI. 9, 14 (2011).
55. See SATEL & LILIENFELD, supra note 49, at 133–35; Greene & Cohen, supra note 37,
at 1783.
56. Greene & Cohen, supra note 37, at 1781, 1784.
57. See id. at 1776 (describing the consequentialist approach as “forward-looking”).
58. See Pardo & Patterson, supra note 39, at 133.
59. See, e.g., Greene & Cohen, supra note 37, at 1784 (“Some day, the law may treat all
convicted criminals this way. That is, humanely.”).
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was espoused by Plato long before the emergence of the Anglo-American
justice system.60
The discussion of the forward-looking process, with emphasis on
rehabilitation and protection of the public, is not a new concept. It is the
underlying theme of the utilitarian view of punishment. Punishment need
not fit the crime, but, to achieve the greatest good, the public needs to be
protected from the offender by either rehabilitation or separation from the
public.61
Turning back to the notion that there is no free will, and therefore the
retributivist theory of punishment is utterly faulty and ought to be
abandoned, Greene and Cohen are hardly alone in their views. The
environmental biologist Richard Dawkins supports this analysis, clearly
stating:
Retribution as a moral principle is incompatible with a scientific view of
human behaviour. As scientists, we believe that human brains, though
they may not work in the same way as man-made computers, are as surely
governed by the laws of physics. When a computer malfunctions, we do
not punish it. We track down the problem and fix it, usually by replacing
a damaged component, either in hardware or software.62

David Eagleman argues that “blameworthiness is the wrong question.”63
Eagleman considers notorious examples, such as Charles Whitman, who, in
sniper fashion, killed a number of people at the University of Texas in
August 1966.64 Whitman was killed by the police.65 His autopsy revealed
a brain tumor pushing on his amygdala, a part of the brain associated with
fear and aggression.66 Eagleman points to frontotemporal lobe dementia as
the cause of serious deviations from socially normal behavior by persons
suffering from the disease.67
Eagleman argues that free will is the wrong basis for a criminal justice
system.68 He is correct. Free will, however, is not the same as moral
blameworthiness, which is the foundation of criminal culpability.69 Moral
blameworthiness recognizes that not all acts are the product of free will,

60. See Richard F. Stalley, Platonic Philosophy of Law, in A HISTORY OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW FROM THE ANCIENT GREEKS TO THE SCHOLASTICS 57 (Fred D. Miller &
Carrie-Ann Biondi eds., 2007).
61. See Hart, supra note 24, at 159–60.
62. Richard Dawkins, Let’s All Stop Beating Basil’s Car, EDGE, https://edge.org/
response-detail/11416 (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/PU53-CW4C].
63. DAVID M. EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO 151 (2011); see also David Eagleman, The Brain
on Trial, ATLANTIC (July–Aug. 2011) [hereinafter Eagleman, Brain on Trial],
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/07/the-brain-on-trial/308520/
[https://
perma.cc/X9G2-7L7H].
64. See Eagleman, Brain on Trial, supra note 63.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id.
69. See R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 529 (Can.); R. v. Martineau, [1990] 2
S.C.R. 633, 645–46 (Can.).
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which is why the system incorporates complete defenses such as insanity,
automatism, and reduced culpability for juveniles.
Eagleman acknowledges that the current state of neuroscience cannot
explain the ordinary criminal’s behavior, but he is strongly of the view that
in the decades to come, it will develop to that degree.70 Eagleman argues,
like Greene and Cohen, that the criminal justice system should not engage
in a backward-looking process but in a forward-looking process, as we will
no longer be able to rely on culpability to determine guilt or craft a suitable
sentence.71 Eagleman’s focus is, in part, on protecting society.72 He
anticipates keeping in prison longer those whose brains suggest that they
will likely recidivate and allowing earlier release for those whose brains do
not.73 This summary is a simplification of his argument, but it appears that
individuals would not be sentenced on the basis of fault but on the basis of
rehabilitation in the name of protection of the public.
The foregoing view of the future of neuroscience is not without its
detractors. Sally Satel and Scott Lilienfeld, in their book Brainwashed, take
a far more cautious approach to the developments of neuroscience in terms
of whether it will affect the criminal law’s approach to culpability.74 They
correctly acknowledge that no one knows where the science will take us.75
They predict that someday neuroscience may detect abnormalities that are
linked to cognitive deficits and are in fact relevant to an accused’s ability to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her act.76
Like Roskies, Satel and Lilienfeld identify one of the main problems with
the theory that the brain affected the action.77 That is, at this point,
causation between brain abnormality and acts cannot be established. Brain
scans generally are taken long after the act. The brain can change and the
scan can be affected by a number of things.78 They point out that, except in
the most extreme cases, such as Whitman’s, experts do not know whether a
given brain abnormality (caused by injury, inherent defect, or disease) is
relevant to the criminal conduct in question.79
Satel and Lilienfeld take a pragmatic approach. They suggest that, at this
point, neuroscience “cannot distinguish between those who could not
control themselves from those who did not control themselves, nor from
those in between who managed to wrestle their impulses to the ground.”80

70. Eagleman, Brain on Trial, supra note 63.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. SATEL & LILIENFELD, supra note 49.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 107.
77. Id.
78. Helen Mayberg, Does Neuroscience Give Us New Insights into Criminal
Responsibility?, in A JUDGE’S GUIDE TO NEUROSCIENCE: A CONCISE INTRODUCTION, supra
note 29, at 37, 37–39.
79. SATEL & LILIENFELD, supra note 49, at 108.
80. Id. at 110–11 (emphasis added).
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The difficulty with the suggestion that neuroscience will fundamentally
change the structure of the criminal justice system is that the science has not
made the predicted significant leap forward. In explaining neuroscience to
judges, Dr. Helen Mayberg advised that the main difficulty with using brain
lesions, brain damage, and changes in the brain to identify criminal
responsibility (or lack thereof) is that the scans are not sufficiently
contemporaneous to link intent at the time of the crime.81 The data, she
says, at best, will only permit general inferences about any abnormality in
the brain found on the scan and in the person’s acts.82
The lack of contemporaneity between the time of the scan and the time of
the offense presents a significant problem in terms of drawing sufficient
causal links between the accused’s brain abnormality and the criminal act.
Additionally, the presence of a brain abnormality does not necessarily mean
that the criminal act was caused by the abnormality.83 As Dr. Mayberg
points out, there are many studies of brain abnormalities in individuals with
well-identified behavior disorders, as well as well-documented cases of
individuals with brain lesions in specific areas and related behavioral
disturbances.84 However, as Mayberg indicates, the research is not at a
stage where brain lesions can predict abnormal behavior; most patients with
brain lesions do not act criminally, and many criminals do not have brain
lesions.85
Satel and Lilienfeld opine that brain scans are of little assistance in the
criminal law context unless they are able to help answer legal questions and
are relevant to the proceedings.86
Let us return to the criminal law itself and try to put these new
developments into context.87 An accused’s mental state is examined at
several stages of a trial and sometimes even before charges are brought.
Certainly, when there is an issue of mental health after a defendant is
charged, the court will look at whether the accused is fit to stand trial,
whether there is a defense of insanity (or “mental disorder,” as Canadian
law defines it) on the issue of guilt or innocence, and whether the person is
capable of entering a plea. Even if the person is deemed fit to stand trial,

81. Mayberg, supra note 78, at 38.
82. Id.
83. See id.
84. Id. at 38–39.
85. Id. at 39.
86. SATEL & LILIENFELD, supra note 49, at 103.
87. First, a brief mention of other areas of law: criminal law does not only encompass
intentional acts; negligence also plays a role in criminal conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962) (defining negligence as one level of
criminal culpability, i.e., mens rea). Also, a number of tort based actions concern intentional
acts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8A, 13, 18, 15, 21, 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
Thus, in terms of assessing intentional behavior, brain science may have significance beyond
the boundaries of criminal law. However, this Article does not expand on this observation
beyond making it.
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the court will gauge his or her mental state at the punishment and
sentencing stage of the proceedings.88
As Professors Stephen Morse and William Newsome have opined, the
concept of free will is an issue for philosophers but not a problem for the
law.89 In their view, neuroscience does not, at this point, add much to
criminal law.90 I share this view except when it comes to sentencing, to
which I will return.
Morse and Newsome argue that at this point, neuroscience is unable to
show neural causation between brain injury and act that would amount to an
excusing condition.91 In their view “causal” explanations cannot amount to
an excuse for a criminal act unless they show a “genuine excusing
condition,” such as insanity.92 According to Morse and Newsome, if
society were to accept the so-called “neural causes,” no one would be held
responsible.93 However, this is not a legal or moral world that anyone
would wish to live in.94 Morse and Newsome state:
[A] neuroscientific causal explanation for criminal conduct, like any other
type of causal explanation, does not per se mitigate or excuse. It only
provides evidence that might help the law resolve whether a genuine
excuse existed or that might be a guide to prophylactic or rehabilitative
measures.95

In short, there are too many unknowns to be able to say anything useful,
at this point, about the role of neuroscience on criminal intent or mens rea.
II. THE EFFECT OF NEUROSCIENCE
ON SENTENCING PROCEEDINGS
For the youth and the intellectually disabled—or, as U.S. jurisprudence
often describes the condition, the “mentally retarded”96—there have been
significant changes in sentencing law with respect to responsibility based
on brain development. In the United States, the law has developed to forbid
the infliction of the death penalty for offenders who are juveniles97 and
88. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that the death penalty cannot
be imposed on the “mentally retarded”).
89. Stephen J. Morse & William T. Newsome, Criminal Responsibility, Criminal
Competence, and Prediction of Criminal Behavior, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 30, at 150, 153.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 154.
95. Id. at 155.
96. This term is frequently still found in U.S. jurisprudence, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002), although the more modern term “intellectual disability” is gaining currency,
especially since the American Association on Mental Retardation (AAMR) changed its name
to the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (AAIDD) in
2007.
97. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (resting the decision in part on the ground
that execution of persons who were under the age of eighteen when their crimes were
committed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
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“mentally retarded,”98 as well as the prohibition on life sentences without
parole for juvenile offenders.99 These developments recognize that those
whose brains are not well developed or mature should not be held to as high
a degree of moral responsibility as adults of “sound mind.” While this
demonstrates a valid link between neuroscience and responsibility, it does
not undermine the foundation of moral responsibility but rather affirms it.
Where neuroscience is being used in the courtroom, at least in the United
States, is at the sentencing stage and, so far, exclusively to mitigate
sentences.100 Earlier, I said that the notion that abandoning the retributive
model and focusing on “going forward” would result in fairer sentences for
offenders was incorrect.101 My observation is based on the fact that in the
not too distant past, punishment theory did focus on “looking forward,”
rehabilitation, and protection of the public. The result was indeterminate
(open-ended) sentences, primarily for youthful offenders.102 Sentences
were increased to effect rehabilitation.103 This approach to sentencing has
been abandoned, save for the aspect that relates to protection of the
public.104 Many jurisdictions, including Canada, Australia, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, maintain indeterminate sentences,
primarily for sex offenders, but have abandoned them for youthful
offenders.105
The retributivist approach to sentencing (i.e., proportionality), balances
the effect of the rehabilitative sentence to achieve a more just sentence
when all of the circumstances are taken into account. Thus, the forwardlooking sentence has been demonstrated to lengthen prison sentences.106
The indeterminate sentence ultimately was abandoned as the sole or even

98. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (holding that the execution of “mentally retarded” offenders
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
99. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
100. See Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study
of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493 (2015).
101. See supra Part I.B.
102. CAN. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING REFORM: A CANADIAN APPROACH 36–38
(1987).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46 (Can.) (stating that those labeled
“dangerous offenders” can receive indeterminate prison sentences); R. (Haney) v. Sec’y of
State for Justice [2014] UKSC 66, (appeal taken from Eng.) (upholding the United
Kingdom’s indefinite detention law despite a contrary European Court of Human Rights
decision); Ian Campbell, Indeterminate Sentences and Dangerousness, in SERIOUS VIOLENT
OFFENDERS: SENTENCING, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW REFORM 81, 81–95 (Sally-Anne Gerull &
William Lucas eds., 1993); Comment, Use of Indeterminate Sentence in Crime Prevention
and Rehabilitation, 7 DUKE L.J. 65, 70–76 (1958) (espousing the mid-twentieth-century idea
that indeterminate sentences were a more humane, rehabilitative, and tailored way of dealing
with criminal behavior); Sentencing Dangerous Offenders, CROWN PROSECUTION SERV.,
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/sentencing_and_dangerous_offenders/#a11 (last visited
Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/3S72-NB4Q]; Life Sentenced Prisoners, JUSTICE, https://
www.justice.gov.uk/offenders/types-of-offender/life (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://
perma.cc/8QTM-DVT5].
106. See CAN. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 102, at 36–38.
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primary sentencing principle because it created an unjust system of
punishment.107
Sentencing proceedings provide for a less strenuous standard for the
admissibility of evidence. The notion of relevance is broadened in order to
address a multitude of sentencing factors, including proportionality (or just
deserts), rehabilitation, deterrence, and denunciation. While evidence of
brain damage or functionality may not be sufficient to exculpate an offender
from criminal liability, it may be highly relevant to crafting the appropriate
sentence and treatment modality.
For example, Farah Focquaert, Andrea Glenn, and Adrian Raine point to
the fact that genes, environment, and events early in life can affect brain
structures.108 Brain imaging can show deficiencies in the amygdala, which
is important for moral socialization.109 Clearly, brain scans may be used in
sentencing proceedings to identify and support claims of lesser culpability
due to circumstances beyond the control of the offender that could have a
mitigating effect on the sentence.
One issue that arises from the potential of neuroscience to predict future
violent behavior or recidivism is whether the prosecution will use that
predictive power as evidence to support longer sentences, preventative
detention, or in favor of the death penalty. This is the so-called “doubleedged sword effect.” Tied to this is the possibility of enforced production
of brain scans, similar to enforced production of fingerprints or DNA
samples. Will the police be able to obtain a warrant for a brain scan at the
time of an offense?
The research demonstrates that, to date, the prosecution is not using the
neuroscience evidence to label offenders as a future danger to society. For
example, in 2015, Deborah W. Denno conducted a study of eight hundred
cases between 1992 and 2012 in which neuroscience evidence had been
used.110 She found that the prosecution has rarely used the evidence and
that the double-edged sword is a myth.111 Denno’s research identified that
neuroscience evidence is often used in death penalty cases in an effort to
show mitigating features to tip the scale against the imposition of the death
penalty.112
In Canadian courts, brain scans are seldom used—I have never seen one
in a criminal case in thirty-five years of practice. However, evidence of
brain damage, fetal alcohol syndrome, addiction, and mental health issues is
often presented in support of sentence mitigation.
It remains to be seen whether, as the predictive features of neuroscience
evidence becomes more certain, the prosecution will be more inclined to
107. See id.
108. Farah Focquaert et al., Free Will, Responsibility, and the Punishment of Criminals,
in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 39, at 247 passim.
109. Annabelle M. Belcher & Adina L. Roskies, Neuroscience Basics, in A PRIMER ON
CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 30, at 27.
110. See Denno, supra note 100.
111. Id. at 544.
112. Id. at 502–04.
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attempt to use it as an aggravating factor. The burden on the prosecution is
great. It is clear that the evidence as it now stands is insufficient to support
an aggravating factor in most cases.
III. THE FUTURE OF NEUROSCIENCE AND CRIMINAL LAW
Many, if not most, of those who have opined on the nonutility of the
brain scan to determine criminal responsibility have not closed the door on
the issue.113 Even Morse and Newsome acknowledge that there potentially
may be a “complete and revolutionary paradigm shift” in the law in relation
to criminal responsibility—just not yet.114 Indeed, a dozen years have
passed since Greene and Cohen’s prediction of a fundamental change in the
criminal law, and the science has not taken us there yet.
At some point in the near future, experts in the field of neuroscience and
law anticipate that neuroscience will be of significant use in identifying or
shedding light on some brain disorders in relation to criminal conduct,
including automatism and insanity. Dementia and tumors are both causes
of brain damage that can be identified by brain scans.115 Future research
may assist in identifying neural markers associated with mental disorder.
The effect of intoxication and addiction on the brain is under active research
and may reveal insights in the not too distant future.116
It is likely that neuroscience will discover evidence of brain disorders
that will expand the definition of excuse or add to the list of accepted
excuses. Roskies and Morse opine that brain science may identify neural
markers that could identify future violence, or perhaps a neurological basis
for psychopathic traits.117 It may be that in the future, we treat conditions
such as psychopathy and pedophilia more as psychiatric disorders than as
criminal conduct.
In addition, neuroscience may provide an ability to better diagnose and
treat brain disorders associated with criminal behavior. In such cases, the
structure of the system as it stands is well equipped to deal with these
innovations. Brain scan evidence will serve to produce more effective and
accurate diagnoses.118
Indeed, some experts opine that the primary role of neuroscience in
criminal law will be to improve the ability to identify those cases that would
result in not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity verdicts.119
In other words, never say never. It is impossible to predict with certainty
where the science will take us in terms of determining responsibility. If it
113. SATEL & LILIENFELD, supra note 49, at 107.
114. Morse & Newsome, supra note 89, at 157.
115. See id. at 167.
116. Id. at 161, 169.
117. Adina L. Roskies & Stephen J. Morse, Neuroscience and the Law: Looking
Forward, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, supra note 30, at 140, 247.
118. See Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, Law and Neuroscience in the United States,
in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW 349 (T.M. Spranger ed., 2012).
119. Nancey Murphy, Cognitive Neuroscience, Moral Responsibility, and Punishment, in
THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 39, at 155, 166.
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does eventually provide significant insights into the mind, it may well be
necessary to revamp our thinking on the Anglo-American system of
criminal justice and perhaps our approach to the law entirely. We will have
to wait and see if we have been getting it wrong for centuries.

